
Mobile communications security


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Matej Kovačič, (CC) 2017 Jozef Stefan Institute Part I: Identity spoofing

CallerID spoofing



CallerID spoofing



CallerID spoofing

			.2012 11:11:02	a state of the	0	SVNSM- Si.mobil SVNSM-	SMS_poslan / 38631595xxx	Out		
		25.02. 25.02.			0	Si.mobil SVNSM- Si.mobil	1807-1985au	In In		
		25.02.	and the second		0	SVNSM- Si.mobil SVNSM- Si.mobil		In In		
		25.02.			0	SVNSM-	38640222xxx	- In		
			and the s			:	SVNS	SM-		
25.02.2012	23:41:22	0:00:04	•	0		Gene Coleta	Si.mo	Mart - Barbara	38640222xxx	k 🦛 In
25.02.2012	23:43:21	0:00:02	,	0		11.2	SVNS Si.mo		38640444xx	(In
20.02.2012	23.43.21	0.00.02		0			SVNS	EC-P	3004044477	
25.02.2012	23:45:04	0:00:02	2	0		100	Si.mo		38640666xxx	(In
25.02.2012	23:46:37	0:00:02	2	0		IERO A HER	SVNS Si.mo		38640888xxx	(In
			0.54.50			SVNSM-				
		27.02.	2012 9:51:56 2012 9:53:05	1E 1E	0	Si.mobil SVNSM- Si.mobil	and other	Out		
		27.02.	The second		0	SVNSM- Si.mobil	1862-621mm	Out		
		27.02.	2012 12:06:54	0:00:20	0	SVNSM- Si.mobil SVNSM-	-	Out		
		27.02.	2012 12:36:34	0:00:42	0	Si.mobil	March and	Out		
		27.02.	2012 12:46:55	1 E	0	Si.mobil	Margin Street	Out		
		27.02	2012 12:49:48	1E	0	SVNSM- Si.mobil	State, property	In		

Practical use of spoofing :-)

GSM module to open garage or front door

We offer a useful device with a simple phone call opens or closes the automated garage or front door.

GSM module is a device which allows an authorized user to open or close the door. Device recognizes up to five specific phone numbers from which they can call on a GSM module which opens or closes the door.


Iku d.o.o. offers you:

- delivery of a package with instructions for use,
- o mounting points agreed upon (please call us and we will send you the offer).

Using the GSM module to open the door:


on automated garage, front door or other GSM module is installed, in which the records are up to five phone (mobile) numbers, which is possible with a quick phone call, in order to door opened or close the door. This method accounts for the use of remote controls or additional equipment and appliances, because we assume that the mobile phone is already





Part II: Intercepting (VoIP) communications


Unencrypted vs. encrypted phone call



Part III: Rerouting outgoing calls

Example: intercepting outgoing calls


SS7 attacks.



Part IV: Rerouting incoming calls/SMS messages

Example: intercepting incoming calls

An attacker pretends that a subscriber is roaming in his network... From this point on, all calls and SMS messages for that subscriber are routed to the attacker.



Now a victim logs into his bank account, and since he is using twofactor authentication, his bank sends SMS to his number with mTAN access code... Posing as a potential customer, this reporter registered an email domain—"smsrouter.co"— and, acting as a new text-message routing service, approached a division of a large-scale, legitimate telecommunications provider in Western Europe.


After exchanging emails over a weeklong period (and specifying the fake company would need coverage in Europe), the telco provided a quote: a one-time setup fee of around \$2,650, with 50 percent paid upfront and the rest with the first invoice after testing, and then a \$6,600 monthly rental fee for a so-called global title (GT)—a designated address for routing messages. The telco also offered to connect The Daily Beast's imaginary company over a SIGTRAN link.

-- https://www.thedailybeast.com/you-can-spy-like-the-nsa-for-a-few-thousand-bucks

Part V: GSM Interception

Toolset for capture and analysis of GSM signals. grgsm_livemon -p 35 -f 938.8M


wireshark -k -Y '!icmp && gsmtap' -i lo



linux; GNU C++ version 4.9.1; Boost_105500; UHD_003.007.003-0-unknown

ARFCN:	18, Freq:	938.6M, CID:	0, LAC:	100, MCC:	293, MNC:	40, Pwr: -35
ARFCN:	24, Freq:	939.8M, CID:	1313, LAC:	100, MCC:	293, MNC:	40, Pwr: -33
ARFCN:	26, Freq:	940.2M, CID:	501, LAC:	100, MCC:	293, MNC:	40, Pwr: -27
ARFCN:	124, Freq:	959.8M, CID:	0, LAC:	0, MCC:	0, MNC:	0, Pwr: -29

Osmocom/gr-gsm




Part VI: IMSI Catchers

01

Basically, they are fake base stations...







Sourcing Solutions ∨ Services & Membership ∨ Help & Community ∨
Products ∨ What are you looking for...

Help & Community 🗸 🔍 Search

About 2325 results: Other Telecommunications Products (47), VoIP Products (1694), Wireless Networking Equipment (408)

Home > Products > Telecommunications > Communication Equipment > Other Telecommunications Products (103492) 🔤 Subscribe to Trade Alert



IMSI catcher

FOB Reference Price: Get Latest Price


US \$1,800 / Unit | 1 Unit/Units (Min. Order)


🖂 Contact Supplier

🕑 Leave Messages 🛛 🖓 Add to My Cart

Payment: This supplier also supports Western Union payments for offline orders.

IMSI Catchers





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CONTINUE TO INTERCEPT ORAL COMMUNICATIONS OCCURRING AT (i) THE SEATING AREA INSIDE BRUNELLO TRATTORIA, 227 EAST MAIN STREET, NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK 10801; (ii) THE SEATING AREA INSIDE MARIO'S RESTAURANT, 2342 ARTHUR AVENUE, BRONX, NEW YORK 10458; (iii) THE SEATING AREA INSIDE AGOSTINO'S RESTAURANT, 969 BOSTON POST ROAD, NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK 10801; AND (iv) THE SEATING AREA INSIDE THE MARINA RESTAURANT, WRIGHT TOTAND MARINA 290 DRAKE AVENUE, NEW

APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS

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
IMSI Catcher (when it is caught :-))

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e212	.imsi											 Expres 	sion
о.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info							
	56.627398		127.0.0.1	GSMTAP					Request				
34	81.125671.	. 127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH)	(RR)	Paging	Request	: Туре	1		
11	. Determen 5												
	-		t: 57272, Dst Port: 47 .ink), TS: 0, Channel:										
		ing Request Type											
	2 Pseudo Ler												
			inator: Radio Resource	s Manageme	ent mess	sages (0x6)						
		Paging Request	Type 1										
	ige Mode	. d											
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): Slovenia (293)										
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020													
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020 030	2b		2b 2b	+	÷	+++++							

Part VII: Mobile Phone Infection [via "classical" malware or via baseband attack]

Real Case (Netflow Analysis)

First we intercept mobile phone network connections and collect IP network traffic.



Real Case (Netflow Analysis)

Data Sets telefon								Welcome	Guest: Man	nual - S
rieure (a)										
Flows [2] Overview Statistics	Per Hour GeoMAP	IPs Source	e [1]	IPs Destina	ion [1]	Protocols	Timeline			
Date 🕈 Time Sou	Irce IP Destin	ation IP	Destinat	ion Name	Source P	ort Destin	ation Port L4	Protocol	Country	•
2017-10:25:10 192.168	8.160.251				50280	443	TCF	SSL I		
2017- 10:25:09 192.168	8.160.251				50277	443	TCF	P SSL		4
B Wireshark · Packet 201114 Z017 TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certifi	cate									T
Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 2805 V Handshake Protocol: Certificate										<:
Handshake Type: Certificate (11) Length: 2801		USER	PI	D PPID	VSIZE	RSS	WCHAN	P	C NAME	A12
Certificates Length: 2798 Certificates (2798 bytes)		root	1	0 1110	23296		SyS_epoll_	-		+
Certificate Length: 1685	l (id-at	root	2	ø	25290 Ø	9/2 Ø		000000000		
<pre>version: v3 (2)</pre>		root	3	2	ø	Ø	smpboot_th			
serialNumber: 0x0		root	7	2	ø	Ø	rcu_gp_kth			
▼ signature (sha256WithKSAEnCryption) Algorithm Id: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	(sha256WithRSAEncryption)	root	8	2	0	0	rcu_gp_kth			
<pre>vissuer: rdnSequence (0) vrdnSequence: 3 items (id-at-commonNa)</pre>		root	9	2	0	Ø	rcu_gp_kth			
 RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-c RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-o 	rganizationName:	root	10	2	0	Ø	smpboot_th			
RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-c > validity	ommonName=	root	11	2	Ø	Ø	smpboot_th			
▶ subject: rdnSequence (0)▶ subjectPublicKeyInfo		root	12	2	Ø	Ø	smpboot_th			-
<pre>v extensions: 9 items v Extension (id-ce-subjectAltName)</pre>		root	13	2	Ø	Ø	smpboot_th			
Extension Id: 2.5.29.17 (id-ce-sul v GeneralNames: 6 items	bjectAltName)	root	14	2	Ø	Ø	smpboot_th			
GeneralName: dNSName (2)		root	17	2	0	Ø	smpboot_th	000000000	o S watc	hdog/2
dNSName: ▼ GeneralName: <u>dNSName (2)</u>		root	18	2	Ø	Ø	smpboot_th			<u> </u>
dNSName: ▼ GeneralName <u>: dNSN</u> amè (2)		root	19	2	0	Ø	smpboot_th		-	
dNSName: ▼ GeneralName <u>: dNSNam</u> e (2)		root	22	2	Ø	Ø	smpboot_th			•
dNSName: v GeneralName: dNSName. (2)		root	23	2	0	Ø	smpboot_th			5 5
v GeneralName: dNSName (2)		root	24	2	0	0	smpboot_th		5	
dNSName :		root	27	2	0	Ø	smpboot_th			•
 Extension (id-ce-basicConstraints) Extension (id-ce-kevUsane) 		root	28	2	0	0	smpboot_th			
: 201114 - Time: 1552.980957 - Source: 217.20.156.148 - Destination: 192.168.160.251 - I	Protocol: TLSv1.2 · Length: 1282 · Info: Certificate	-	29	2	Ø	0	smpboot_th			
Help		root	32	2	Ø	0	smpboot_th			
		root	33	2	ø	Ø	smpboot_th			
		root	34	2	ø	Ø	smpboot_th			

Questions?



Matej Kovačič matej.kovacic@ijs.s:



https://telefoncek.si